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Did the Sixth Circuit Get It Right in Stadnyk?: What 
to Do About the § 104(a)(2) Personal Injury 
Damages Exclusion 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year, millions of dollars are awarded to victims of physical 
and non-physical personal injury. These damages include amounts 
for lost wages, actual medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional 
distress, and punitive damages, among others. Taxes are a lurking 
factor affecting the amount that ultimately ends up in the pocket of 
the injured party. The courts and Congress have changed the 
relevant income tax standards multiple times in the past ninety years, 
making planning difficult for the injured parties and their attorneys.  
Courts provide remedies for wrongs; specifically, tort law 
attempts to restore the victim to his or her previous position. 
Although most scholars and empathizers agree that no amount of 
money can truly restore personal injury victims to who and what they 
were before the injury, federal income tax law still considers the 
amount of money received by tort victims as “accessions to wealth,” 
which are taxable sums1 except to the extent that Congress has 
provided a statutory exclusion.2  
Legislators have grappled with the extent to which the injured 
party’s compensation should be taxed, and particularly with the 
implications of § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
excludes compensation received for personal physical injuries but not 
for non-physical injuries.3 The relevant language is as follows: “gross 
income does not include . . . the amount of any damages (other than 
punitive damages) received . . . on account of personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness.”4 From 1918 to 1996, however, if a 
judgment or settlement was granted “on account of personal injuries 
or sickness,” the statutory exclusion allowed the entire amount of 
damages to be exempt from federal income taxes, regardless of 
 
 1.  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 2. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 3.  Id. § 104(a)(2). 
 4. Id. (emphasis added). 
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whether the personal injury was physical or non-physical.5 Both 
Congress and the courts have made various changes since that time, 
first denying tax-free status for non-compensatory punitive damages6 
and then, in 1996, reducing the exclusion to only “personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness.”7 Since 1996, as long as a recovery 
amount has its origin in personal physical injury or sickness, all 
resulting damages (except punitive damages) are excluded under § 
104(a).8 So, if a physical injury leads to emotional-distress damages, 
those damages would be excluded. However, Congress specifically 
decreed that “emotional distress” is not itself a physical injury or 
sickness and therefore cannot be the independent origin of an 
excluded recovery, although reimbursement for specific medical care 
costs may be excluded.9  
There has been significant uncertainty in determining whether a 
personal injury award qualifies for an exclusion. In order to promote 
predictability and consistency, the exclusion should be eliminated. 
Removing the exclusion would also result in increased clarity and 
uniformity in the law, sympathy for the victim, and revenue for the 
federal government. Moreover, it would comply with tax laws and 
constitutional principles. 
This Note considers the current treatment and application of the 
§ 104(a)(2) exclusion in the context of a recent case, Stadnyk v. 
Commissioner.10 In Stadnyk, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the 
exclusion did not apply to a settlement amount based on a claim of 
 
 5. Id. § 104(a) (1994), amended by 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. II 1995–1997). 
 6. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1995); Bagley v. Comm’r, 105 T.C. 
396, 416–17 (1995). In 1996, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to explicitly provide that the 
exclusion was inapplicable to punitive damages, but this amendment applied only 
prospectively. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (Supp. II 1995–1997). Later in 1996, the Supreme Court 
held that punitive damages are not excludable under the pre-amendment language of § 104(a). 
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 89–90 (1996); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 143 
(1996) (explaining that punitive damages are not excludable because they “are intended to 
punish the wrongdoer and do not compensate the claimant for lost wages or pain and 
suffering”). 
 7. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1995–1997) (emphasis added). 
 8.   Id. 
 9. Id. § 104(a) (2006). Although emotional distress is not a physical injury, damages 
paid for the specific medical expenses from emotional distress can be excluded, but only if not 
previously allowed as a deduction under § 213(d)(1) and only to the extent of the actual 
amounts paid for the medical care. Id. Damages from wrongful death claims—including 
punitive damages if no other damages may be awarded under state law—also may be excluded. 
Id. § 104(c).  
 10. Stadnyk v. Comm’r (Stadnyk II), 367 F. App’x 586 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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false imprisonment.11 In Part II, this Note will outline the history of 
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion and then describe the Stadnyk decisions by 
the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit. Part III will provide analysis of 
these decisions as well as the actions of the legislature, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), and other courts with respect to the § 
104(a)(2) exclusion, and will then consider options for 
improvement. In Part IV, this Note will conclude. 
II. TAX HISTORY AND STADNYK 
In terms of what was considered “income,” tax law used to be 
much more taxpayer-friendly than it is now. In the monumental 
1955 Glenshaw Glass case, the Supreme Court ruled that any 
accession to wealth must be included in gross income unless a clearly 
defined exclusion applies.12 Based upon the precedent established in 
Glenshaw Glass, courts consistently construe income broadly and 
exclusions narrowly.13  
Thus, from the taxpayer’s view, the key to favorable tax 
treatment is finding an applicable exclusion, which is why the § 
104(a)(2) exclusion for personal injuries has been so important. 
Beginning in 1918, the exclusion afforded wide opportunity for tax 
avoidance. Initially, judgments or settlements received on account of 
personal injuries or sickness were excluded from gross income in 
their entirety. Since 1918, however, the courts, the legislature, and 
the IRS have whittled away that exclusion to an exclusion allowance 
only for damages that are not punitive damages as long as they are 
based on personal physical injuries or physical sickness, with few 
exceptions.14 
A. The Stadnyk Story 
On a fateful Wednesday in December 1996, the Stadnyks went 
to Nicholasville Road Auto Sales to buy a car for their son.15 Using 
 
 11. Id. at 593. 
 12. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 13. Stadnyk v. Comm’r (Stadnyk I), 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 475, 476 (2008) (citing 
Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995)).  
 14. The two exceptions to the general § 104(a)(2) exclusion rules are that recovery 
amounts for punitive damages may be excluded for certain wrongful death claims, 26 U.S.C. § 
104(a)(c), and that recovery amounts limited to the actual medical expenses for any emotional 
distress may be excluded, id. § 104(a). 
 15. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 587; Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 475. 
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two checks written by Mrs. Stadnyk, the couple bought a Geo Storm 
for about $3500, but as they drove it away, the car broke down just 
seven miles from the store.16 The Stadnyks had the car repaired at a 
cost of about 14% of the vehicle’s purchase price.17 When the 
Stadnyks attempted to complain about the car, Nicholasville Auto 
ignored their calls, put them on hold, or did not return the calls.18 
So Mrs. Stadnyk called Bank One to stop payment on one of the 
checks she tendered when making the purchase; the check was for 
$1100.19  
The bank stopped the payment, but it incorrectly stamped the 
check as “NSF,” indicating insufficient funds, instead of the 
description Mrs. Stadnyk requested: “dissatisfied purchase.”20 In 
response to the seemingly worthless check, Nicholasville Auto filed a 
criminal complaint against Mrs. Stadnyk on February 4, 1997.21 On 
Sunday, February 23, 1997, at around 6:00 p.m., officers from the 
County Sheriff’s Office in Fayette, Kentucky arrested Mrs. Stadnyk 
in her home and in front of her husband, her daughter, and a family 
friend.22 The officers took Mrs. Stadnyk to the County Detention 
Center.23 They photographed her, handcuffed her, and put her in a 
holding cell.24 At 11:00 p.m., the officers transferred Mrs. Stadnyk to 
the Jessamine County Jail.25 After administering a pat-down and 
electric-wand search on Mrs. Stadnyk, the officers ordered her to 
undress to her undergarments, remove her bra while the officers 
stood nearby, and then put on an orange jumpsuit.26 She was 
released on bail at around 2:00 a.m. on February 24, 1997.27 In 
April of the same year, Mrs. Stadnyk was indicted for “theft by 
deception over $300.00” because of the misstamped check, but 
Nicholasville ultimately dropped all charges.28  
 
 16.  Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 587–88. 
 17.  Id. at 588. 
 18. Id.; Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 475. 
 19.  Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 588. 
 20. Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 475. 
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Mrs. Stadnyk admits she did not suffer any physical injuries—she 
was not jerked around or grabbed; she experienced no bruising or 
pain from handling or handcuffing during her imprisonment—but 
she was “physically restrained against her will and subjected to police 
arrest procedures.”29 She also visited with a psychologist eight times 
over a two-month period in the aftermath of the arrest.30 Her 
insurance and employer covered her treatment costs; she did not pay 
out-of-pocket costs for any repercussions of the incident.31  
In August of 1999, Mrs. Stadnyk filed a complaint against Bank 
One, the owner of Nicholasville Auto, and Nicholasville Auto itself.32 
The charges and damages included the following: 
nominal damages, compensatory damages and special damages, 
including, but not limited to, attorney’s fees to defend, lost time 
and earnings, mortification and humiliation, inconvenience, 
damage to reputation, emotional distress, mental anguish, . . . loss 
of consortium[,] . . . fraudulent misrepresentations relating to the 
condition of the Geo Storm[,] . . . [m]alicious prosecution, abuse 
of process, false imprisonment, defamation, and outrageous 
conduct.33 
In a mediation agreement in 2002, Bank One settled with Mrs. 
Stadnyk.34 In exchange for Mrs. Stadnyk’s dismissal of the complaint, 
Bank One wrote a letter of apology and agreed to pay her $49,000.35 
The settlement agreement simply provided for a lump-sum payment 
and included no explicit allocation of the amount of the settlement.36 
The claims against Bank One and Nicholasville Auto were each 
dismissed with prejudice, although the public record does not 
contain the terms for dismissal of the claims against the Nicholasville 
Auto entities.37  
During the mediation with Bank One, the mediator and 
attorneys all advised the Stadnyks that the settlement amount could 
 
 29. Id. at 476. 
 30.  Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593–94. 
 37. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 476. 
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not be taxed.38 Without getting any additional tax advice, Mr. 
Stadnyk prepared a 2002 federal income tax return for himself and 
for Mrs. Stadnyk and excluded the settlement amount.39 In March of 
2005, the IRS Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to the 
Stadnyks (for not including the $49,000) in the amount of $13,119 
with an accuracy-related penalty under § 6662(a) of $2624.40 
B. Law, Major Arguments, and Court Analysis 
The Tax Court followed the current and time-proven trend of 
interpretation to construe income broadly and exclusions narrowly.41 
The Tax Court held that the Stadnyks were liable for the tax 
deficiency but not liable for the penalty.42 The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Tax Court’s interpretation and ensuing order.43 
In the Tax Court, the Stadnyks had two major arguments for 
relief from tax liability: (1) the settlement was excluded from gross 
income by the § 104(a)(2) personal physical injury exclusion,44 or, in 
the alternative, (2) the settlement was excluded because 
compensatory damages for personal injuries are not income in the 
first place.45  
The success of the Stadnyks’ first argument depended on the 
court’s interpretation of § 104. Section 104(a) states: “gross income 
does not include . . . (2) the amount of any damages (other than 
punitive damages) received . . . on account of personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness. . . . For purposes of paragraph (2), 
emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical 
sickness.”46 To determine whether the Stadnyks’ situation qualified 
for exclusion under § 104(a)(2), the Tax Court and Sixth Circuit 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41. Id. at 477; see supra text accompanying notes 1–2, 12–13. 
 42. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478–79. 
 43. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 587. 
 44. Id. at 591. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2006). The cases failed to mention, however, that the last 
sentence of § 104(a) provides for the exclusion of medical expenses not deducted under § 213, 
which can include expenses for the treatment of emotional distress. Id. The Stadnyks likely did 
not argue this point because Mrs. Stadnyk’s medical expenses were paid in full by her employer 
and her insurance. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 588. 
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Court applied the two-pronged test from Commissioner v. Schleier.47 
Under this test, “(1) The underlying cause of action giving rise to 
the settlement award must be based upon tort or tort-type rights, 
and (2) the damages must be received on account of personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness.”48 In analyzing the underlying 
cause of action, courts must look to the intent of the payor in 
making the settlement.49 Considering the nature of Mrs. Stadnyk’s 
claims against the payor (Bank One) and the payor’s intent in 
making the settlement, the Tax Court recognized the possibility of 
the claims being either contract or tort claims, but decided that the 
ultimate injury resonated in tort law.50 Thus, the Tax Court found 
that the claims satisfied the first prong of the Schleier test,51 and the 
Sixth Circuit Court agreed.52 
According to both courts’ analyses, however, Mrs. Stadnyk’s case 
failed to satisfy the second prong of the Schleier test, which requires 
that the settlement proceeds be paid “on account of personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness.”53 Mrs. Stadnyk argued that 
although she did not suffer physical harm, physical restraint and 
detention qualify as physical injuries under § 104(a)(2).54 The Tax 
Court relied on Kentucky judicial opinions holding that “[i]njury 
from false imprisonment is ‘in large part a mental one’ where the 
plaintiff can recover for mental suffering and humiliation.”55 The 
court also referred back to the explicitly non-physical injury claims: 
“mortification and humiliation, inconvenience, damage to 
reputation, emotional distress, [and] mental anguish.”56 These non-
physical injury claims are not excludable under the text of § 
104(a)(2) or as applied in relevant cases.57 Even if Mrs. Stadnyk had 
 
 47. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 591; Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 476. 
 48. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 476 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006)); 
Comm’r v. Schleier, 513 U.S. 323, 336–37 (1995)). 
 49. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 477 (citing Stocks v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 1, 10 
(1992)). 
 50. Id. at 477–78. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 592. 
 53. Id. at 592–94; Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478.  
 54.  Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478. 
 55.  Id. (quoting Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)).  
 56. Id. at 476, 478. See supra text accompanying note 33.  
 57. Id. at 478 (citing Sanford v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1618 (2008); Polone v. 
Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 698 (2003), aff’d, 505 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2007); Venable v. 
Comm’r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (2003), aff’d, 110 F. App’x 421 (5th Cir. 2004)).  
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originally pleaded physical restraint as a physical injury, she would 
not have prevailed because the exclusion requires not just an incident 
that involves a physical act, but also that the physical act be the 
reason for the damages.58 The Sixth Circuit also recognized that 
following Mrs. Stadnyk’s position would be sanctioning a per se rule 
that all false imprisonment cases involved physical injuries.59 If 
physical restraint were enough to qualify an incident as a “physical 
injury” under § 104, every false imprisonment case—cases, which by 
definition require physical restraint60—would fall under the § 104 
exclusion.61  
Instead, the court distinguished between an inherently physical 
act and a physical act that causes physical injury;62 only if the 
inherently physical act had caused a separate physical injury and was 
the reason for the damages would Mrs. Stadnyk have qualified for the 
personal physical injuries exclusion by having received her settlement 
“on account of personal physical injuries.”63 Because the agreement 
shed no light on the reasoning for the settlement, and because the 
Stadnyks provided no other evidence that the settlement was “on 
account of personal physical injuries,” the courts held that the 
settlement could not be excluded from the Stadnyks’ gross income 
under § 104(a)(2).64 
Both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit held that the Stadnyks’ 
constitutional argument—that taxing personal injury settlements 
violates the Sixteenth Amendment and is a direct tax that is not 
apportioned—were without merit.65 The Sixth Circuit relied upon 
 
 58. See infra Part III.A.3.a. 
 59.  Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593. 
 60. See infra text accompanying notes 102–19. 
 61. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. The Sixth Circuit explained that the wording “on account of” requires more 
than a “but for” link of causation. The physical injury must be the “direct causal link” for the 
settlement; the settlement must “be awarded by reason of, or because of, a personal physical 
injury.” Id. (citing O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 83 (1996)); see also Greer v. United 
States, 207 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 64. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593–94.  
 65. Id. at 594–95. Although the constitutional argument is interesting, much literature 
and many court opinions confirm that § 104(a)(2) is constitutional. The constitutionality issue 
will not be explored in this Note. For information about the constitutionality question, see 
Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), overruled by Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Margarita R. Karpov, Note, To Tax or Not to Tax – That Is the Question in 
the Midst of Murphy v. I.R.S., 23 AKRON TAX J. 143 (2008); Ellen Overmyer Lloyd, 
Comment, The Taxman Cometh: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for 
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the Supreme Court in ruling that compensatory settlement awards 
are constitutionally taxable and are excludable from gross income 
only if specifically excluded by a provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code.66 Therefore, for the Stadnyks to succeed, their only recourse 
would be to prove that there was some physical injury to qualify for 
the exemption. Beyond the constitutionality of the tax, if personal 
awards were not income, § 104(a) would be unnecessary.67 The 
Stadnyk cases and related literature discuss the constitutional issues 
in more depth,68 but this Note will focus on the statutory and policy 
questions surrounding “personal physical injury.”  
Despite its ruling that the exclusion did not apply, the Tax Court 
found that the Stadnyks acted in good faith and had reasonable cause 
to understate their income, so the accuracy penalty did not apply.69  
III. ANALYSIS 
The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit may have done their best to 
follow the precedent as it has developed from 1918 to the present, 
but the Stadnyk case is a perfect example of how the law has become 
unnecessarily complicated. Although Stadnyk was correctly decided 
as to precedent and existing law, Stadnyk can serve to warn decision 
makers and urge them to reevaluate the path that the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion has taken to become the creature it is today. This Note will 
analyze what purpose the exclusion has come to serve and how 
removing the exclusion entirely will provide a better solution than 
the current law. 
Part A will analyze the history of the exclusion and highlight 
some issues with the current state of the law, and Part B will consider 
the options for interpretation or alteration of the exclusion going 
forward and suggest a course of action.  
 
Non-Physical Injures, 54 LOY. L. REV. 375 (2008).  
 66. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 590. The court emphasized the “sweeping” reach of 
income under § 61. Id. It quoted precedent exactly on point: “subject to certain exemptions, 
which are to be construed narrowly, § 61(a) applies to all income, including settlement 
payments.” Id. (quoting Polone v. Comm’r, 505 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 67. Id. at 590. 
 68. For references to the constitutional discussion, see supra note 65. 
 69. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 481. Also, since the Internal Revenue Service did 
not appeal the Tax Court’s determination that the accuracy penalty should be dropped, the 
Sixth Circuit did not discuss the penalty. 
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A. The Law As It Stands and As Applied in Stadnyk 
The fate of the Stadnyks’ pocketbook, to the tune of a federal 
income tax liability exceeding $13,000, was determined by the 
court’s definition of “physical injury.”70 The Sixth Circuit almost 
robotically checked off the Schleier checklist, filling in the blanks by 
analogizing precedent to fit the Stadnyks’ situation.71 The court did 
not explain the rationale behind its decision or behind the decisions 
upon which the court relied.72 What brought the courts and the code 
to their current positions? What should be the definition of “physical 
injury?”  
Part 1 of this section will discuss the legislative history and issues 
that led the Stadnyk court to its position. Parts 2 and 3 will discuss 
the way the exclusion currently works as demonstrated in the 
Stadnyk cases, including an analysis of the two-part Schleier test, and 
the interpretation and exceptions to the common interpretation of 
“personal physical injury.” 
1. Rationales for the § 104(a) exclusion 
In order to understand the state of the law leading into Stadnyk, 
the policy considerations courts might promote in the future, and 
the direction the legislature may pursue in the future, a discussion of 
the potential rationales, or lack of rationales, for the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion is helpful. From a tax standpoint, exclusions from gross 
income often contradict tax principles.73 Social policy and 
implications often drive the decision to implement a federal income 
tax exclusion.  
The legislative history of § 104(a)(2) does not explain the 
rationale behind Congress establishing the exclusion,74 and the 
rationales suggested in court opinions for initially establishing an 
exclusion for personal injuries and then reducing the exclusion to 
only personal physical injuries or sicknesses are not particularly 
enlightening or intellectually satisfying. Two rationales have been 
offered as justifications for establishing the exclusion. First, recovery 
 
 70.  Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 595. 
 71.  Id. at 591–94. 
 72.  Id. 
 73. See infra Part III.B.1.c. 
 74. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 142–44 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
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for personal injuries simply restores the “human capital”75 that the 
victim lost—restoring him or her to the rightful, pre-injury position; 
and, therefore, the recovery of human capital that simply replaced 
nontaxable human capital adds nothing to the individual and cannot 
be taxed.76 A second suggested justification for the exclusion is 
sympathy for the victim of a personal injury.77 These rationales 
illustrate that the exclusion for personal injury victims focuses on the 
victim. 
The human-capital theory can be explained through the example 
of a typical car accident. The human ability to move, think, and work 
can constitute capital. The car accident, however, may strip the 
human of all those abilities, resulting in a loss of human capital. A 
settlement puts a dollar amount on those forfeited abilities and 
restores the lost human capital. Early cases asserted that “restoration 
of capital [is] not income.”78 According to the human-capital theory, 
since restoration of capital is not income, restoration of human 
ability that was diminished or destroyed in an accident is also not 
income and therefore not taxable. The theory characterizes this 
human capital as “well-being,” or “personal assets that the 
Government does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim 
not lost them.”79 Based on this theory, the Supreme Court in 1996 
emphasized “there is no strong reason for trying to interpret the 
statute’s language to reach beyond those damages that, making up 
for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, 
‘return the victim’s personal or financial capital.’”80 In the false 
imprisonment context, the human-capital theory might encompass 
the view that “the ability to take a breath of fresh air, to sleep in 
one’s own bed, to attend a family gathering, is not taxable.”81  
 
 75. “Human capital” is the term for any characteristics or abilities that allow a human to 
earn compensation; these characteristics and abilities can be emotional, mental, or physical. 
JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: 
DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 269 (3d ed. 2004).  
 76. Id. at 268–69 (quoting Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927)). 
 77.  Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Notes, Taxation of 
Damages Recoveries from Litigation, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 345, 346 (1955)). 
 78. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 84 (1996); Francisco v. United States, 267 
F.3d 303, 307 (3d Cir. 2001); see S. Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918); Doyle v. 
Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 187 (1918). 
 79. Francisco, 267 F.3d at 307 (quoting O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86). 
 80. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86.  
 81. Robert W. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, 119 TAX NOTES 
279, 287 (2008) [hereinafter Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?].  
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In tax law, the flaw with this line of reasoning is that “human 
capital” has no basis and therefore cannot offset an accession to 
wealth or “return of capital.”82 If taxpayers receive a return from 
exercising human capital (as taxpayers do regularly to earn wages), 
they cannot claim a basis in human capital to offset that return. If 
recoveries of human capital were excluded pursuant to capital-
recovery theory, taxpayers could argue that a basis in human capital 
offsets wages too, and ordinary income from wages would not be 
included in gross income.83 They might say that wages, after all, are 
only compensation for human capital in the form of time spent 
doing work, brainwork, or physical exertion. In personal injuries, 
taxpayers may argue that the amount of cash received was not even 
from the exercise of human capital, but rather given as a replacement 
of lost human capital. Even when capital is returned or replaced, if 
the capital had no tax basis to begin with, any amount received 
would be included in gross income; such is the case with “recovery” 
or “replacement” of human capital.84 The human-capital theory does 
not justify excluding personal injury recoveries. 
The second rationale for the § 104(a)(2) exclusion is Congress’ 
sympathy for the injured party. The Ninth Circuit in Roemer v. 
Commissioner explains “[t]he rationale behind the exclusion of the 
entire award is apparently a feeling that the injured party, who has 
suffered enough, should not be further burdened with the practical 
difficulty of sorting out the taxable and nontaxable components of a 
lump-sum award.”85 Various courts recognize that settlement 
amounts, including lost wages, normally would be taxable but 
believe that Congress concluded that victims of personal injury 
should not have to deal with the headache of calculating and paying 
taxes on part of the money given to them in an effort to make them 
whole.86  
The two rationales, as weak or as strong as they may be, were 
disregarded by Congress when it whittled away the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion. Congress ignored prior attempts to sympathize with 
victims through simplified tax calculations by failing to allow 
 
 82. DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 269–70. 
 83. Id. at 270. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Notes, Taxation of 
Damages Recoveries from Litigation, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 345, 346 (1955)). 
 86.  See, e.g., id. 
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exclusions of recoveries based on non-physical injuries and did not 
follow the human-capital theory for exclusion. The human-capital 
rationale may explain why punitive damages were the first part of 
personal injury settlements to become taxable and not excluded from 
gross income.87 However, this theory provides that emotional 
capacities and ensuing injuries exemplify human capital and should 
be excluded from gross income, even though they are expressly 
excepted from the §104(a)(2) exclusion. Also, regarding the 
sympathy rationale, victims today are not any less deserving of 
sympathy than they were from 1918 to 1996. Based on today’s law 
that distinguishes personal physical injuries from personal non-
physical injuries, victims certainly must sort through taxable and 
non-taxable portions of their awards and wonder if the IRS will 
hound them for what they think is excludable.88 If Congress 
introduced the exclusion based on human-capital and sympathy 
theories, Congress apparently abandoned the rationales when it 
amended the § 104(a)(2) exclusion.89  
Despite any rationales for and benefits from the exclusion, the 
big picture of suffering puts that reasoning into perspective. One tax 
commentator and law professor astutely shared the following 
opinion: 
The real reason that § 104[(a)(2)] is part of the law—whatever the 
tax theorists may say about it—is the idea that tort victims should 
be pitied rather than taxed. But if society is being solicitous of folks 
who are injured, why pick the most fortunate subset—injured folks 
who, unlike most victims of personal injury, receive monetary 
compensation? And, given the vagaries of the tort system . . . why 
give the biggest tax benefit to the most fortunate sub-subset, those 
who are fortunate enough both to be injured by a deep pocket and 
to be able to convince a jury to award massive damages? . . . Repeal 
of 104[(a)(2)] would merely recognize that compensated victims 
are better off than uncompensated victims. They are also better off 
 
 87. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955) (“Damages for 
personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive damages, on the other hand, 
cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes.”).  
 88. The Tax Court in Stadnyk even held that the Stadnyks acted reasonably when they 
excluded the settlement amount from their income tax return. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 
479; supra notes 42 and 69 and accompanying text. The sympathy rationale for excluding 
personal-injury damages would certainly frown on the extended grief and headache caused by 
the uncertainty of the law.  
 89.  See supra text accompanying notes 3–9.   
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than the still larger contingency of people who suffer as a result of 
natural causes, but are unable to sue God.90  
Although Congress cannot realistically solve all the inequities in life, 
Congress can improve this area of law by reconsidering the confusing 
state of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, reviewing the pros and cons to 
the taxpayers and to the government of its application, and assessing 
other solutions that might simplify and improve the law. 
2. Schleier and the two-pronged test 
One of the largest influences on the Stadnyk decision was the 
two-pronged test made famous in Commissioner v. Schleier.91 
Although “personal physical injury” is not specifically defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code or in the test, the test attempts to sketch the 
appropriate context for application of the exclusion. Regulation § 
1.104-1(c) states that “[t]he term ‘damages received (whether by 
suit or agreement)’ means an amount received . . . through 
prosecution of a legal suit or action based on tort or tort type rights, or 
through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such 
prosecution.”92 Based on the text of the regulation, in Commissioner 
v. Schleier the Supreme Court stamped its approval on the two-
pronged test for exclusion under § 104(a)(2).93 Decisions since 
Schleier have consistently relied on this test.94 The court in Stadnyk 
 
 90. DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 272 (quoting email from Phillip D. 
Oliver, Ben J. Altheimer Distinguished Professor, Univ. of Ark., Little Rock, Law School 
(email on file with authors)). 
 91. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336–37(1995). The Schleier case was tried in the 
Supreme Court before the 1996 amendments, but the test applies to the updated language in 
the same way that it applied to the pre-1996 language; the amendment simply adds the 
“physical” requirement to the Schleier test. Hennessey v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1756 
(2009). The courts have consistently applied the test to the present day. See infra note 94.  
 92. 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1964) (emphasis added). 
 93. The Court emphasized, however, that the two-pronged test did not subsume the 
statutory requirement but was an additional aid to identify applicable cases. Schleier, 515 U.S. 
at 333. 
 94. Courts in every circuit except the First Circuit (which has not addressed the issue) 
have followed the Schleier test. Green v. Comm’r, 507 F.3d 857 (5th Cir. 2007); Murphy v. 
IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Rivera v. Baker W., Inc., 430 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 
2005); Tamberella v. Comm’r, 139 F. App’x 319 (2d Cir. 2005); Peaco v. Comm’r, 48 F. 
App’x 423 (3d Cir. 2002); Abrahamsen v. United States, 228 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Fabry v. Comm’r, 223 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2000); Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322 (6th 
Cir. 2000); Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 1999); Mayberry v. United 
States, 151 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 1998); Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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delineated the two prongs as follows: “(1) The underlying cause of 
action giving rise to the settlement award must be based upon tort 
or tort type rights, and (2) the damages must be received on account 
of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”95 This Part will 
discuss the first prong and Subpart 3 will discuss the second prong.  
The first prong of the test states that the exclusion applies only in 
tort-type cases. The test causes courts, including the Stadnyk court, 
to step back and look at the claim to see if it as a satisfactory tort 
claim or not. A simple contract case, for example, would not satisfy 
the first prong of the test, and a related damage award would 
therefore fail to qualify for exclusion under § 104(a)(2). 
The courts must determine whether tort principles are in 
question, which is not necessarily a simple task. For example, United 
States v. Burke,96 which was decided before the 1996 amendments, 
concerned the taxability of damages for Title VII sexual 
discrimination claims. The district court held that the damages were 
not excludable; the Sixth Circuit Court then reversed, holding that 
the amount was excludable; however, the Supreme Court reversed 
again holding that the amount was not excludable.97 The issue at all 
levels was whether or not discrimination is a tort or tort-like cause of 
action. The district court and the Supreme Court focused on the fact 
that the available remedies for Title VII discrimination were limited 
to back wages; tort damages, in contrast, typically include many 
other considerations and forms. Because of the stark difference in 
available remedies, the Court held the circumstances in Burke 
distinguished it from a tort or tort-type case, and, therefore, the 
ensuing damages were not excludable under § 104(a)(2). As 
Congress had established the available remedies, the Court claimed 
that Congress itself deemed the situation non-tort-like. Congress 
later expanded the available remedies, suggesting that the technical 
issues that swayed the Court were not truly dispositive to the 
determination of a personal injury.  
Tying the analysis to tort principles seems to result in time—both 
in and out of court—spent away from the real crux of the issue: 
whether the case fits within the statutory exclusion itself. Attorney 
Robert W. Wood agreed, claiming that the test is “more tautological 
 
 95. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 476; see also Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 591. 
 96. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
 97. Id. at 242. 
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than helpful.”98 For example, the taxpayer in the Schleier case tried to 
circumvent the statutory language by relying alone on the “tort or 
tort type rights” part of the language of the regulation and test.99 
However, Schleier asserts that a given case cannot fall within the 
exclusion unless the situation meets both requirements: the 
requirement of the statutory language and both prongs of the two-
prong test, which are implied from the statutory language.100 The 
“tort or tort type rights” prong of the Schleier test is a prime example 
of how complicated and time-consuming the § 104(a)(2) exclusion 
analysis has become.  
3. Personal physical injuries 
The second prong of the Schleier test, however, refers to the 
meat of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion’s statutory language: the damages 
must be received “on account of personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness.”101 Mrs. Stadnyk lost on this second prong because the 
Sixth Circuit Court found that her imprisonment was not a § 
102(a)(2) “physical injury.” The court effectively set a precedent that 
false imprisonment, on its own, will never constitute a physical 
injury. Although this precedent is set, the court left the boundaries 
of “physical injury” undefined and vulnerable to costly, litigious 
debate in the future. 
 a. False imprisonment is not a physical injury per se. The Stadnyk 
court conceded that false imprisonment “involves a physical act—
restraining the victim’s freedom.”102 The court, however, required an 
additional act of injury for the exclusion to apply and emphasized the 
importance of that injury actually being the reason for the 
damages.103 
Considering the specific circumstances of the case, the Stadnyk 
court first looked to the definition of false imprisonment to see if the 
tort itself could be considered a physical injury.104 Kentucky courts 
 
 98. Robert W. Wood, Why False Imprisonment Recoveries Should Not Be Taxable, 123 
TAX NOTES 1217, 1219 (2009). 
 99. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 333–34 (1995). 
 100. Id. at 336–37. 
 101. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006). 
 102. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593. 
 103. Id. at 593–94. 
 104. Id. at 592. 
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define the tort of false imprisonment as “any deprivation of . . . 
liberty . . . or detention for however short a time without such 
person’s consent and against his will”105 and as a tort that “protects 
personal interest in freedom from physical restraint.”106 The Sixth 
Circuit joins with the Kentucky precedent to conclude that “[i]njury 
from false imprisonment is ‘in large part a mental one.’”107 Other 
jurisdictions108 and the Restatement of Torts share similar definitions 
of false imprisonment.109 Based on the non-physical definition of 
false imprisonment, the court concluded that making false 
imprisonment a per se physical injury would be inaccurate.  
Commentators and sympathizers, however, urge that the physical 
and injurious nature of imprisonment qualifies it for the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion. Wood asserts that “there is nothing mental about being 
subjected to the physical confinement of imprisonment/ 
incarceration. . . . [T]he primary thrust of a false imprisonment 
claim . . . is not mental.”110 Mrs. Stadnyk was not imprisoned 
mentally, although the imprisonment had emotional repercussions; 
she was physically handcuffed and physically confined. If the court 
found that the physical nature of imprisonment qualified it as a 
personal physical injury, all damages flowing from the imprisonment 
itself, even emotional damages, would then be excludable under § 
104(a)(2).111  
 
 105.  Id. (quoting Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky. 
1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478 (quoting Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 479 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 108. Many jurisdictions recognize that the tort of false imprisonment descended from the 
tort of trespass to person by “protect[ing] the personal interest in freedom from physical 
restraint.” Rendely v. Town of Huntington, No. 2:03-cv-03805-ENV, 2006 WL 5217083, at 
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2006); Padilla v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 2d 479 (M.D. Pa. 2001); see also 
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (“the injury is in large part a mental 
one”); Adams v. Uno Rests., Inc., 794 A.2d 489, 493 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Webbier v. 
Thoroughbred Racing Protective Bureau, Inc., 254 A.2d 285, 293 n.4 (R.I. 1969) (“[T]he 
injury involved in false imprisonment is in part a mental one.”)). 
 109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35–36 (1965) (noting that the tort of false 
imprisonment requires the victim to be conscious of his or her confinement and unaware of an 
escape). 
 110. Wood, supra note 98, at 1220. For Wood’s other articles on the same topic, see 
Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, supra note 81, and Robert W. Wood, IRS 
Allows Damages Exclusion Without Proof of Physical Harm, 123 TAX NOTES 1388 (2008) 
[hereinafter Wood, IRS Allows Damages Exclusion]. 
 111. See Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, supra note 81, at 287.  
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The court, however, apparently was not persuaded by that 
argument. Although “false imprisonment . . . may cause a physical 
injury, . . . the mere fact that false imprisonment involves a physical 
act—restraining the victim’s freedom—does not mean that the 
victim is necessarily physically injured as a result of that physical 
act.”112 The court simply refused to accept the interpretation that 
false imprisonment alone is a physical injury. The court refused to 
“create a per se rule that every false imprisonment claim necessarily 
involves a physical injury.”113  
Although not mentioned in the Stadnyk case, the strict 
requirement by the IRS that the injuries be visible likely underlies 
and informs the court’s determination that false imprisonment falls 
outside the definition of “personal physical injury.” In one specific 
ruling, the IRS established a bright-line rule that physical injuries 
must be observable.114 The ruling, known as the “bruise ruling,”115 
focuses on physical manifestation of injury: “physical contacts 
resulting in observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling, 
and bleeding are personal physical injuries under § 104(a)(2).”116 
The decision also quoted Black’s Law Dictionary, “which defines the 
term ‘physical injury’ as ‘bodily harm or hurt, excluding mental 
distress, fright, or emotional disturbance.’”117 Black’s definition 
alone does not rule out the possibility of false imprisonment being a 
physical injury, as the imprisonment itself could be considered 
“bodily harm or hurt,” but the lack of an outward, observable bodily 
harm sets false imprisonment per se—and the Stadnyk case—outside 
the bounds of the strict requirement.  
Even if the imprisonment did result in a separate, observable 
physical injury, such as bruising from the handcuffs, the exclusion 
applies only when the physical injury directly resulted in the award. 
Stadnyk explains that the phrase “on account of” requires “a direct 
causal link between the physical injury and the damages recovery in 
order to qualify for the income exclusion,”118 establishing that 
 
 112. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593. 
 113. Id. 
 114. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41022, ¶ 15 (July 17, 2000). 
 115. Robert W. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, supra note 81, at 
285.  
 116. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-41022, ¶ 15 (July 17, 2000).  
 117. Id. 
 118. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593; see, e.g., Shelton v. Comm’r, 94 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1592 (2009); Sanford v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1618 (2008); Mumy v. Comm’r, T.C. 
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evidence and causation must be provided by the plaintiff.119 Thus, if 
Mrs. Stadnyk were bruised from the handcuffs, the only damages 
that would qualify for the § 104(a) exclusion would be those she 
could prove were awarded specifically because of that bruising; the 
bruising would not bring all of the damages from the false 
imprisonment claim into the exclusionary ambit. The Sixth Circuit, 
by denying the interpretation that false imprisonment itself is a 
physical injury, effectively blocked false imprisonment cases like the 
Stadnyks’ from applying the exclusion. 
 b. A presumption of a physical injury could lead to exclusion. A 
recent concession made in an IRS letter ruling provides that in rare 
cases, the court may deem physical injuries to exist although the 
plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence of the injuries and of the 
causal link between the injuries and the recovered damages.120 This 
presumption could arguably apply to false imprisonment cases but 
would not likely apply in the Stadnyk case. 
The letter ruling in question uses general language, describing a 
situation where a victim was injured in tort long before the 
recovery.121 Because the initial injuries occurred so long ago, 
establishing the origin and extent of physical injuries may be difficult. 
Based on that difficulty, the IRS states that it will presume not only 
the existence of physical injuries but also that the settlement amount 
was made on account of the presumed physical injuries.122  
 
Summary Op. 2005-129, 2005 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 122 (August 24, 2005); Tamberella 
v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1020 (2004), aff’d, 139 F. App’x 319 (2005). 
 119. Stadnyk II, 367 F. App’x at 593 (citing Greer v. United States, 207 F.3d 322, 334 
(6th Cir. 2000)). 
 120. See Payments to Settle Tort Claims Are Excludable from Gross Income, Not Subject to 
Information Reporting, TAX NOTES TODAY, March 3, 2008. 
 121. Id. The exact language of the ruling is as follows:  
You have inquired about the tax treatment of payments made by Entity to settle 
claims of Tort asserted by C. C has alleged that Entity’s agent(s) X caused physical 
injury through Tort while he was a minor under the care of X. A substantial amount 
of time has elapsed since the alleged Tort occurred. C alleges that he continues to 
struggle with the trauma resulting from the alleged Tort. Because of the passage of 
time and because C was a minor when the Tort allegedly occurred, C may have 
difficulty establishing the extent of his physical injuries. Under these circumstances, 
it is reasonable . . . to presume that the settlement compensated [the individual] for 
personal physical injuries, and that all damages for emotional distress were 
attributable to the physical injuries. 
Id. 
 122. Id. 
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Because the letter ruling used such general terms and did not 
provide a clear line of analysis to apply to other cases, determining 
the ruling’s rationale and breadth of application seems a speculative 
task.123 On the other hand, the broad language allows, at the very 
least, general analogizing and application; the ruling itself also 
suggests that the IRS might be rethinking the rigidity of the 
observable-bodily-injury requirement.124 One commentator 
interprets the ruling to suggest that cases that are “inherently and 
incontrovertibly physical, whether or not they leave lasting outward 
scars,” such as sexual abuse cases or even false imprisonment cases, 
may fit into the narrow exception.125 Although not stated explicitly 
in the letter ruling, perhaps the bar for presumption of exclusion 
relates to the amount of sympathy a certain case elicits. It remains 
unclear, however, what other sorts of cases, if any, the IRS will deem 
to be based on a personal physical injury.  
The court in Stadnyk did not consider a presumption of physical 
injury, probably because Mrs. Stadnyk herself testified that she did 
not suffer any physical harm apart from the imprisonment itself.126 In 
addition, the Stadnyk case did not involve a long-past incident that 
made proof of physical injury difficult, as in the letter ruling that 
presumed physical injury. However, leaving the Stadnyk precedent 
unaffected, the Sixth Circuit Court could theoretically find that a 
U.S. citizen falsely imprisoned for eight hours under fire in Iraq 
during the war and suffering from extensive mental trauma 
presumptively127 suffered physical injuries, and that those injuries led 
to an excludable settlement amount.128 A line needs to be drawn to 
 
 123. Additionally, revenue rulings and letter rulings, such as the ruling under 
consideration, while internally binding on the IRS, are not binding on the court system. 
DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 99–101. 
 124. Wood, IRS Allows Damages Exclusion, supra note 110, at 1391. 
 125. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, supra note 81, at 286. 
 126. The ruling suggests that a potential presumption of injury does not do away with 
the physical, observable injury requirement from the “bruise ruling,” but only says that the 
victim does not have to prove that physical injury. Id. 
 127. The presumption would likely have to be made based on the same difficulties of 
obtaining proof mentioned in the IRS letter ruling; although the injury victim does not prove 
physical injuries like cutting and bruising, the physical injuries are presumed to have occurred 
because of the specific circumstances of the case. Courts could also potentially follow the 
general direction of the letter ruling and broaden the application of the presumption to cases 
not based simply on a lack of proof, but based on the seriousness of an injury that is 
“inherently and incontrovertibly physical.” Id. 
 128. Even if the origin of the recovery was not held to be a “physical injury,” the last line 
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delineate cases presumptively deserving the tax-free status from cases 
that do not make the cut. Even though eight hours may not be 
enough to elicit a presumption of physical injuries, what about eight 
days or eight years? The length of time of the injury itself suggests an 
increased likelihood of physical injuries, and if the injury lasts for a 
long time, the difficulty of proving the physical origin of the injury 
claims increases and makes the situation analogous to the case in the 
letter ruling. If the breadth of the IRS ruling expands, some false 
imprisonment cases could be deemed to involve physical injuries if 
the conditions of the imprisonment are bad enough.  
Confronted with the example used above, the court might 
presume personal physical injuries for the U.S. citizen imprisoned in 
Iraq and still suffering from the repercussions of the incident if that 
citizen legitimately could not prove the physical damages (based on 
the passage of time or difficulty of accessing evidence). Perhaps 
Congress’s intention in establishing the physical injuries requirement 
was that ancillary claims of physical injuries would differentiate cases 
like the Stadnyk’s, which are worthy of an award of damages but do 
not elicit enough sympathy to avoid taxes, from serious 
imprisonment cases.129 But with the state of the current law, even if 
Mrs. Stadnyk had been grabbed and bruised, the court still would 
not likely find that the entire settlement was “on account of” that 
bruising.130 The hypothetical U.S. citizen imprisoned in Iraq for 
eight hours would also likely not get his or her entire settlement 
excluded on the ground that physical injuries were deemed to occur. 
Courts considering a “serious” imprisonment case (a case that may 
qualify for the presumption, such as the U.S. citizen in Iraq) might 
also find that abuse and pain constitute “physical injury,” but only a 
small percentage of the ultimate settlement amount was actually “on 
account of” those physical injuries. The bulk of the recovery would 
be for the false imprisonment itself, a claim that is “in large part a 
mental one.”131 The IRS ruling may have some potential to change 
the personal-physical-injury exclusion analysis, but no case law 
 
of § 104(a) still allows that any recovery awarded specifically for this victim’s medical expenses, 
and not deducted under § 213, may be excluded. 
 129. Wood, supra note 98, at 1220. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 112–19. 
 131. Stadnyk I, 96 T.C.M (CCH) at 478 (quoting Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 479 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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currently supports the trend, and, even if the analysis changed, the 
exclusion still leads to complicated calculations and uncertainty.  
In sum, the current law for applying and interpreting § 
104(a)(2) requires a claim based on tort or tort-type rights. For the 
best chance of being excludable under § 104(a)(2), that claim must 
meet the “bruise ruling” requirement—with potential narrow 
exceptions—by involving an observable bodily physical injury that is 
the precise reason for a distinct amount of damages. If the initial 
threshold is met, to the extent that those damages are not punitive 
damages, they will be completely tax-free. The Stadnyk court applied 
this current law and appropriately found that Mrs. Stadnyk’s 
experience does not fit the exclusionary mold. 
B. Removing the § 104(a)(2) Exclusion 
Although Stadnyk was technically correct according to current 
law, it highlights some issues Congress should consider: the 
unnecessarily complicated state of the exclusion, the lack of 
predictability for the taxpayers, and the lack of clear reasoning for the 
exclusion, among others. Taking Stadnyk as a warning sign to 
reevaluate the law concerning the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, Congress 
should consider the various potential changes it could make to the 
exclusion in the future. This Comment argues that the best option is 
to remove the exclusion entirely. The exclusion could continue as 
established in Schleier and Stadnyk, requiring courts to determine 
case by case what matches the applicable precedent and jurisdictional 
definitions of tort and physical injury well enough to qualify for the 
exclusion. Alternatively, Congress could amend § 104(a)(2) so that 
it reverts to its original form, which allowed recoveries for non-
physical injuries to qualify for exclusion. The exclusion could also be 
repealed so that all personal injury recoveries are fully taxable.  
The exclusion will probably not revert to its former state or be 
repealed; it will likely continue to taunt taxpayers and appear as the 
subject of litigation into the indefinite future. However, this is not 
the best path. The exclusion should be repealed because doing so 
provides an alternative solution to fulfill the policy concerns 
motivating an exclusion; provides clarity, simplicity, and sympathy to 
the taxpayers; and, as an added bonus, will provide additional 
revenue to the deficit-stricken federal government.  
Although removing the “personal physical injuries or physical 
sickness” exclusion would be a bold and unexpected move by 
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Congress, the overall result would benefit victims and the 
government. As the law stands, the uncertainty over the difference 
between physical and non-physical personal injuries causes advisors 
and taxpayers to be unsure of what qualifies for the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion and what does not, and the lines drawn by the code seem 
arbitrary. Although the initial public reaction to removing the 
exclusion may be that the taxpayers would be hugely disadvantaged, 
the publicity would hopefully attract enough attention to the subject 
that opinion leaders would examine the situation and realize the 
benefits. 
The benefits of removing the exclusion include satisfying 
practical and policy considerations and adhering to appropriate tax 
law principles. Removing the exclusion will allow practitioners and 
courts to apply the law predictably and consistently, place the burden 
on the appropriate party (the person responsible for the personal 
injury), increase sympathy to the victims,132 and provide revenue for 
the federal government. Additionally, the proposed tax scheme 
would adhere to tax and constitutional principles; courts have ruled 
that a tax on personal-injury recoveries is constitutional,133 and an 
analysis based on tax principles reveals that taxing personal-injury 
recoveries is consistent with time-proven tax theories and practices.134  
1. Policy and practical rationales for removing the exclusion 
Since courts and scholars say that the exclusion for personal 
physical injuries and sicknesses is not constitutionally required,135 the 
decision whether to keep or remove the exclusion depends on policy, 
practical, and political considerations. Since the 1996 amendments 
eliminated much of the exclusion, completely abolishing the 
exclusion seems possible if supported by appropriate policy and 
practical reasons. By removing the exclusion, the law will provide 
predictability and sympathy for the taxpayer, appropriately shift the 
 
 132. The proposed tax scheme will show sympathy to personal injury victims in that they 
will not be subject to surprise costs and protracted litigation if they reasonably, but incorrectly, 
apply the law and exclude an amount that should be included (like the Stadnyks did). See infra 
Part III.B.1.b. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
 134. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 268–72 (“The only combination 
of tort and tax rules that produces a correct result on ‘both sides’ (claimant and defendant) is 
one where tort damages are computed on a before-tax basis and are included in the claimant’s 
gross income.”); infra Part III.B.1.c. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
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burden of the tax liability to the personal-injury perpetrator, and 
provide much-needed revenue to the federal government.  
 a. Predictability for the taxpayer. As the law currently stands, 
predicting which part of a personal injury recovery will be excludable 
can be extremely complicated, and, based on the excludability of the 
recovery, the taxpayer also has to consider what part of his or her 
attorney’s fees will be deductible. Personal injury recovery amounts 
may include various parts: recovery for future lost earning capacity, 
recovery for past lost earnings, recovery for medical expenses, 
recovery for future medical expenses, recovery for pain and suffering, 
punitive damages, and prejudgment interest, among others.136 After 
allocating portions of the settlement or award to each of those parts, 
the injured parties and their advisors then have to parse out the parts 
of the recovery that represent excludable amounts.  
If a victim received each of the above listed categories of awards, 
if he or she can prove the allocation of the total award to each part, 
and if the injury was “physical” according to § 104(a)(2), then all 
the categories listed except punitive damages,137 prejudgment 
interest, and recoveries for medical expenses already deducted under 
§ 213 will be excludable under § 104(a)(2).  
If another victim received each of the above listed categories of 
awards and he or she can prove the allocation of the total award to 
each part, but if the injury was not “physical” according to § 
104(a)(2), then all of the categories listed above will be includable 
under § 104(a)(2) except recoveries for medical costs not deducted 
under § 213 and perhaps the recovery amount for future medical 
expenses. The key provision for non-physical injury recoveries is the 
last sentence of § 104(a). The phrase that bars emotional distress 
from being considered as a personal physical injury or physical 
sickness “shall not apply to an amount of damages not in excess of 
the amount paid for medical care . . . attributable to emotional 
distress.”138 Therefore, personal injury recovery amounts for “paid” 
medical care may be excludable, regardless of whether the recovery 
amount was for a physical injury or for non-physical emotional 
distress. The law is unclear, however, as to whether recovery 
 
 136. Examples taken generally from DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 275. 
 137. If the situation falls within the narrow exception in § 104(c) for some wrongful 
death claims, however, the punitive damages will be excludable. 26 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2000). 
 138. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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settlements for future medical care can fall under the provision in the 
last line of § 104(a). The word “paid” may or may not include future 
medical expenses. 
After determining the parts of the actual recovery that are 
excludable or not excludable, that determination will then affect the 
portion of the victim’s legal fees that may be deductible. Only legal 
fees allocable to the taxable portions of the recovery are deductible, 
so the victim will determine the proportion of the recovery that is 
taxable and then deduct that same proportion of the legal fees.139 For 
example, assume that a personal-injury victim received a settlement 
of $9 million and paid $3 million in legal fees. If the $9 million was a 
recovery for physical injuries under § 104(a)(2) and included no 
punitive damages, none of the $9 million would be includable, so 
none of the $3 million would be deductible. If the $9 million 
included $3 million of punitive damages not excluded by the 
exception in § 104(c), then only one-third of the recovery was 
includable, so only one-third of the $3 million in legal fees will be 
deductable. If the recovery is not clearly excluded under § 104(a)(2), 
then planning and tax reporting become even more complicated.  
The simplified examples in the above paragraphs directly 
contradict the Ninth Circuit’s sentiment in Roemer that “the injured 
party, who has suffered enough, should not be further burdened 
with the practical difficulty of sorting out the taxable and nontaxable 
components of a lump-sum award.”140 Since the 1996 amendments, 
the injured party has had a more difficult time determining the tax 
implications of his award. By eliminating the § 104(a)(2) exclusion 
entirely, Congress would remedy this difficulty, follow Roemer, and 
provide predictability and workability. 
Making all personal injury recoveries includable in income taxes 
would give the personal injury sufferers the predictability necessary 
to make informed decisions about what settlement amount to accept 
and how much of the amount to report to the IRS. With all other 
circumstances held the same, if all personal injuries were includible in 
gross income, all the different categories from the settlement would 
 
 139. Although those legal fees will be deducted under § 212, the fees will be deducted as 
miscellaneous itemized deductions and subject to the disadvantages characteristic of 
miscellaneous itemized deductions. For explanations of miscellaneous itemized deductions and 
the alternative minimum tax, see DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 516–18, 569–
70, 772–74.  
 140. Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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be taxable, the legal fees would be entirely deductible, and the courts 
would waste no time or expense making the “physical” or “non-
physical” determination. 
The benefit of a predictable application of the law can only be 
realized, however, if the parties involved are informed and apply 
these principles. Currently, state courts, which typically determine 
litigated personal-injury recovery amounts because personal-injury 
claims fall under state-determined tort law, vary as to whether juries 
are instructed to consider taxes or not when they make their 
judgments.141 Although the states’ actual practices will not be 
conclusively determined by a change in federal law, as long as the 
change in the taxability of personal injury recoveries is well 
advertised, the state courts may and hopefully will142 begin to 
consistently deliver before-tax recovery amounts (i.e., increased 
damage awards to include the amount of tax due thereon). Also, if 
settling out of court, parties to a dispute and their advisors need to 
be aware of the change in the law and the necessity to consider taxes 
in their settlement amounts.  
Congress would easily produce the awareness necessary by 
making the bold move to abolish the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. The 
general public would likely be aware of the change, but even if 
citizens do not understand, advisors (such as the mediator and 
attorneys who misadvised the Stadnyks) and the judiciary should be 
informed of such a drastic modification to the current law. 
In sum, removing the complicated, litigiously expensive, and 
unpredictable § 104(a)(2) exclusion would simplify litigation, reduce 
its costs, and provide predictable results for taxpayers. 
 
 141. DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 271–72 (“[T]ort law (mostly state 
law) is not consistent in its approach to calculating damages, and in some cases the jury isn’t 
even told about the taxability or exclusion of damages.”); Laura Dietz et al., Effect of Income 
Tax Exemption, Generally, 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 794 (2010); John E. Theuman, 
Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or 
Death Action, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 589 (2010) (describing trends and listing cases where the state 
courts allow or disallow instructions to the jury regarding federal-income-tax implications of a 
tort award). 
 142. In ideal circumstances, the courts would begin to consistently deliver before-tax 
recovery amounts. In reality, this consistency may or may not occur due to rules regarding 
includability of evidence regarding tax, but removing the exclusion would give the courts a 
reason to conform. Also, many courts concede that even without tax instructions, juries already 
will often inflate awards to account for tax liabilities. Theuman, supra note 141.   
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 b. Sympathy to the taxpayer. If the § 104(a)(2) exclusion were 
removed, Congress would show sympathy to the taxpayer by giving 
the victim of a personal injury predictable tax results while placing 
the burden of the tax on the appropriate party—the party responsible 
for the personal injury (assuming that all states adopted a rule of 
awarding damages that included the amount of tax due).  
With the clarity and consistency that would result from removing 
the exclusion, injured parties could get the appropriate amount, and 
the appropriate party would pay the tax liability. As the law stands, 
when the excludable or includible status of the remedy is unclear, 
parties sometimes walk away with a windfall and sometimes walk 
away with tax liabilities that reduce their recovery to an amount 
below what they deserve or need. For example,143 if a party loses 
$10,000 in wages from a personal injury, to restore that party to her 
pre-injury state, she needs $10,000 before taxes. So, if the jury awards 
her $10,000, and the award ends up being excludable under § 
104(a)(2), she walks away with a windfall of the amount she would 
have been taxed if she had actually received her wages and paid taxes. 
If the jury takes taxes into account and awards less than $10,000 
based on her tax bracket, but then the amount ends up being 
includible in her gross income because the personal injury was non-
physical, she walks away with less than she would have ended up with 
if she had actually received her wages and paid taxes.  
When certain personal injury recoveries are excludable from gross 
income and other recoveries are includible in gross income, if the 
courts fail to take taxes into account when calculating damages (i.e., 
the damages are not increased to include taxes thereon), the party 
with the benefit will always be the personal-injury perpetrator. If 
taxes are not considered, the perpetrator of a non-physical personal 
injury has a smaller amount to pay, but the personal-injury victim 
still has to pay taxes from that amount. Because the benefit goes to 
the perpetrator, the current law could be seen to sympathize with 
the party responsible for the personal injury and not the injured 
party.144 Opponents of removing § 104(a)(2) may argue that 
 
 143. Example based generally on the example in DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 
75, at 271. 
 144. Along that same sympathizing vein, when the perpetrating party is a company, the 
entire settlement or judgment against them is likely to be deductible as a business expense. In 
Stadnyk, Bank One’s settlement amount of $49,000 was likely deductible against Bank One’s 
ordinary income as a business expense.  
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abandoning the exclusion and attempting to include taxes in 
recovery amounts may discourage perpetrators from buying liability 
insurance because an increase in damage awards will increase 
insurance costs. Increased insurance costs may discourage some 
perpetrators from buying insurance, but the inclusion of tax liability 
in damage awards may alternatively encourage perpetrators to buy 
insurance, even at a higher rate, because the need for coverage 
increases with the change in law. Perpetrators would be responsible 
for greater damage awards, so they would have a greater incentive 
than before to have insurance coverage. Overall, removing the 
exclusion is a step in the direction of justice and sympathy for the 
appropriate party—the injured party—assuming that state law follows 
the federal charge and begins increasing damage awards by the tax 
due thereon. 
The Stadnyks’ case may be analogized to the latter example 
above where the party ended up with an amount less than she 
deserved. In Stadnyk, thinking that the amount was excludable from 
gross income, the parties settled on $49,000. If the exclusion had 
been removed and all parties were aware that the amount would be 
includable in the Stadnyks’ gross income, then, to account for the 
tax liability, they would likely have required the settlement amount 
to be closer to $66,940 instead of $49,000.145 Because the law was 
unclear, the Stadnyks ended up with only $35,881 after taxes. The § 
104(a)(2) exclusion, however well intentioned, resulted in a 
significant loss to a couple that had already suffered. Removing the 
exclusion and shifting the tax burden to personal-injury perpetrators 
will allow sufferers like the Stadnyks to consistently get the amounts 
they deserve.  
 c. Revenue for the federal government. The United States 
government operates with a yearly deficit and has an increasing bill 
of public debt.146 As of December 18, 2010, the outstanding public 
debt was above $13.8 trillion—meaning each citizen’s “share” is 
approximately $44,840 as the national debt continues to increase at 
 
 145. If the tax on $49,000 was $13,119, the average rate was around 26.8%. To get an 
after-tax amount of $49,000, the before tax settlement would have to be around $66,940. 
 146. Frequently Asked Questions About the Public Debt, TREASURYDIRECT, 
http://treasurydirect.gov/govt/resources/faq/faq_publicdebt.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 
2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/15/2011 2:03 PM 
1193 Did the Sixth Circuit Get It Right in Stadnyk? 
 1221 
about $4.15 billion a day.147 The government needs additional 
sources of revenue, and taxing personal-injury recoveries will provide 
some of that much-needed revenue from the pocket of the 
wrongdoer. 
If courts and parties who settle can consistently calculate 
recovery amounts to include taxes, the victims will receive the 
appropriate amounts while the wrongdoers will pay the dues to the 
government.148  
2. Consistency with tax principles 
Tax principles concerning human capital, basis, and income 
suggest that the correct treatment of personal injury recoveries is 
inclusion in gross income. Additionally, as discussed above, the only 
way to get a consistent and accurate result for both sides of a 
personal injury claim involving tort damages is to compute the 
amount of damages on a before-tax basis and include the amount in 
the gross income of the injured party.149  
Based on tax principles, recovery amounts in this context could 
be excludable if they are offset by basis as a tax-free return of 
capital.150 Personal injury recoveries, however, cannot be offset by a 
basis in human capital because human capital does not create a basis 
or have any tax attributes. Moreover, personal injury recoveries 
cannot be excluded from gross income under the theory that they 
are lost human capital because that approach does not create an 
exclusion for gross income. It merely allows the taxpayer to offset 
basis against the amount received if there is any basis. But as we have 
seen, there is no basis in human capital.151 The natural treatment of 
personal injury recoveries, then, is full inclusion, unless Congress 
interferes to create an exclusion. Tax theories do not justify 
 
 147. TREASURYDIRECT, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2010); U.S NATIONAL DEBT CLOCK, http://brillig.com/debt_clock/ 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2010). 
 148. If the party responsible for the personal injury is a business, it will likely get a 
deduction for the recovery amount paid to the victim. In this case, if the exclusion were 
abolished, the government might not end up with revenue from the damages, but the 
taxpayers would not get the double tax benefit they would experience otherwise. If the 
exclusion were in place, both sides would theoretically get a tax break from the excludability.  
 149. See DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 272; supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 150. DODGE, FLEMING & GEIER, supra note 75, at 269–70. 
 151. See id. at 269–71. 
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Congress’s decision embodied in §104(a)(2) to exclude personal 
injury recoveries from gross income.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Congress’s intervention to create exclusions may sometimes be 
justified and function well, but based on the cost to the taxpaying 
public and the government of determining when the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion applies, the cost and stress to personal injury victims of 
determining what parts will or will not be excluded (the benefit 
often being inappropriately bestowed on the perpetrator from the 
exclusion), and the revenue needs of the federal government, the § 
104(a)(2) exclusion should be abolished. If the § 104(a)(2) 
exclusion is removed, Congress will be changing the rules one last 
time to put the excludability question to rest. The millions of dollars 
awarded each year based on claims of personal injury or infringement 
of personal rights will do the same as before to restore the victim to 
his or her previous position, while the perpetrator effectually pays the 
cost to the injured party and to the federal government. Tort and tax 
law cannot solve all the injustices of personal injury, but Stadnyk and 
similar cases can provide Congress with the stimulus necessary to 
take a step in the direction toward legal accuracy and fairness to 
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